18/04/2024
Region: Europe
Author: Stephany Vargas
Between June 6-9, 2024, European voters—battered by a pandemic, an economic downturn, and two still ongoing wars in Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighborhoods—will elect the 720 MEPs that will sit in the European Parliament for the next five years. Given the turbulent context, many voters will look for alternatives to the mainstream parties that steered the agenda in the previous legislature. According to polls, hard-right parties are expected to secure a significant number of seats at the expense of their competitors.
This means that, while the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) and center-left Socialists & Democrats (S&D) that have dominated the European Parliament for decades will remain the largest forces in Chamber, any coalition they build to achieve a majority will come under unprecedented pressure from the right. This pressure will be amplified by the fact that the liberal Renew (RE), environmentalist Greens, and The Left are all expected to lose seats after the June vote. Coupled with national shifts that have turned economic competitiveness and identarian issues as the top priorities, the rightward shift of the Parliament will at least partly redraw the EU’s policy agenda.
Where things stand
Under the outgoing legislature, the EPP and S&D were the largest parties in the Parliament. Depending on the issue, to reach a majority, they used votes from the liberals from Renew (RE) third largest bloc, or from other blocs, most notably the Greens on environmental policy. Under this configuration, the hard-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and, to an even greater extent, the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) were sidelined in coalition building.
Over the past five years, the political context, and consequently voter preference, in Europe has changed drastically. Despite setbacks in Poland, far-right parties got into power in Italy, participated in the governing coalition in Sweden, and recently came in first in the general elections in The Netherlands. It bears reminding that, despite the “European” moniker attached to this June’s elections, voters will pick 720 MEPs via national parties in elections held in 27 different member states. This means that national preoccupations will inevitably guide much of the result.
A diminished grand coalition plus
After the June vote, projections anticipate that the current majority, known as “grand coalition plus” (EPP, S&D, and RE), will retain a weaken control of the EU Parliament, while right-wing groups, ID in particular, are anticipated to grow. According to projections, a center-to-hard-right alliance including EPP, RE and ECR would still fall short of a majority. Declining support for mainstream parties is likely to hit RE especially hard, with ID slated to take over as the Parliament’s third-largest force. Under this scenario, RE and ECR would then be neck-and-neck in fourth and fifth position. The Greens, after the 2019 “Green Wave” that gave them their highest number of seats to date, and The Left are also slated to lose seats.
Latest polls indicate that EPP could end up with around 179 seats, S&D with approximately 143, numbers roughly equivalent to their current positions. By contrast, RE is at risk of losing almost a fifth of their current representation and end up with about 83 seats. The ID is projected to secure around 92 seats, up from its current 59, and ECR will possibly reach 87, up from its current 68 seats. By contrast, the Greens are expected to hold on to only 48 seats, down from their current 72, while the Left is at risk of losing about 10 percent of its current 37 seats.
Changing priorities
The expected rightward shift of the Parliament will echo recent national elections that have rewarded political parties prioritizing identitarian and authoritarian discourses. To respond to voters’ expectations, European parties have pivoted their manifestos to match the new political context. In particular, the EPP has shifted to the right, moving away from the Green Deal that permeated public discourse in 2019 and now advocates for a harder-edged “Economic Deal”.
Also trying to adjust to changing voter preferences, S&D aims to balance seemingly irreconcilable priorities. They seek to strengthen international relations with both the US and China. They continue to promote the Green Deal and a path to climate neutrality, but also want the EU to more forcefully push its trading partners to adhere to the strict social and environmental norms that apply inside the bloc.
Beyond Parliament
Under this new configuration, the ECR and the ID groups would have greater influence in the policymaking process, holding more key positions, such as rapporteurs of texts and chairs of Committees, than under the outgoing legislature. In turn, the Commission will need to work more closely and strengthen the dialogue with the groups at the Parliament to move texts forward in the legislative procedure.
In addition, with member states increasingly reprioritizing European competitiveness and strategic autonomy, the Commission is likely to face calls to re-evaluate and possibly water down existing climate legislation, that had been at the heart of the outgoing Commission.
The rightward shift in Parliament and at the national level will also affect the appointment of Commissioners. For instance, the razor-thin majority of the grand coalition could disrupt the re-election prospects of Ursula von der Leyen, the current President of the Commission and an EPP candidate. Her staunch support for Israel in its war against Hamas, as well as her firm stance regarding trade with China were not always coordinated with member states and have caused dissatisfaction, even within the EPP. While von der Leyen has endeavored to secure support from leaders ranging from the far-right such as Italy’s Giorgia Meloni to the socialist Head of State in Spain, Pedro Sanchez, a lot of uncertainty still surrounds her candidacy at this stage.
Supporting the head of the Commission will be a College of Commissioners whose composition is essentially steered by member states. Whoever is nominated to head the Commission will have to effectively allocate portfolios to 27 Commissioners while navigating preliminary agreements with countries and securing parliamentary approval. Candidates for those 27 Commissioner positions will face hearings in Parliament, where MEPs will grill them on their plans to address economic recovery, political instability in the region, and the migration crisis.
Just after the elections, Orbán’s Hungary will take the Presidency of the EU Council from July to December 2024, and the prioritization of policy issues aligned with its agenda, such as migration, may delay negotiations on other files and potentially stall progress on critical issues.
Conclusion
The upcoming EU elections will likely result in significant changes in both the Parliament’s and the Commission’s priorities. Behind an unchanged EPP-S&D-RE, the rightward shift in Parliament will re-order priorities to more closely match national political landscapes across Europe, possibly slowing down some of the files that have not been finalized before the elections.
Amid this policy shakeup, there will be windows of opportunity to introduce new topics in Parliament’s agenda, requiring actors to monitor the outcomes of the elections and granular analysis of the new landscape.