Insight and Analysis

July 2018

By Daniel P. Erikson and Gabriella Ippolito

Latin America’s year of elections continues with final electoral results in Colombia and Mexico. 

Colombia

In Colombia, Ivan Duque won the presidential election on Sunday, June 17. Duque is a conservative politician and the political protégé of former President Alvaro Uribe, although he insists that he is his own man.

Duque beat his opponent, the former mayor of Bogota Gustavo Petro, by 12 percentage points and received 54 percent of the vote. His win was widely expected and predicted by virtually all of Colombia’s major polls. He will be sworn in on August 7 for a four-year term. 

Duque is Colombia’s youngest president ever- he is 41 years old. He has limited experience in government and previously served as a senator from 2014 to 2017 and worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington. On the economic front one can expect relative continuity with President Santos’ policies. Duque has said he wants to create a business-friendly environment by cutting taxes and boosting investment. 

His running mate, Marta Lucia Ramirez, will become Colombia’s first female vice-president. She is an experienced politician and a former senator who served as Minister of Defense in the Uribe government. Marta Lucia had made an initial run for the presidency as well, until she aligned herself with Duque. 

In his acceptance speech Duque said that his goal is to unite Colombia and tackle income inequality. However, he also stated that he wants to overhaul the 2016 Peace Accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group.  Duque, and those who voted for him, want tougher punishments for the crimes committed by the rebels and want to change the rules that granted former rebels 10 seats in Congress.

The Peace Accord was President Juan Manuel Santos’ most notable achievement and one for which he was granted a Nobel Peace Prize. President Santos has said that the Accord could be improved but that it cannot be undone because the country’s constitutional court ruled it binding on the three governments that follow the Santos administration. 

Implementing the Accord will be a challenge for the Duque government – particularly the integration of former fighters and the development of the Colombian countryside which had been under guerrilla control for over 50 years. The new president will also have to deal with over a million displaced Venezuelans who have fled their failing country for Colombia, and who have added an additional stress to Colombia’s social services.

Mexico  

In Mexico, the country elected the leftist populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (who often goes by “AMLO”) of the National Regeneration Movement (Morena) Party on Sunday, July 1. López Obrador's campaign was fueled by anger at the corruption which has been plaguing Mexican politics in recent years, as well as at the violence which the country has been subjected to (120 politicians were murdered during this election cycle). 

As with Colombia, Lopez Obrador’s victory was predicted by the polls which had shown him 20 points ahead. Forty-five minutes after the polls closed, his two main opponents, Jose Antonio Meade of the PRI and Ricardo Anaya of the PAN party, conceded. After an initial vote count, Lopez Obrador is expected to have taken 53.6% of the vote compared to Anaya’s 22.6 percent and Meade’s 15.5 percent. Lopez Obrador won the largest percentage ever in a presidential election since Mexico became a democracy 20 years ago.

Lopez Obrador is the former mayor of Mexico City and this was the third time he ran for President (he ran in 2006 and 2012). Over 3,400 federal, state and local races were contested in this election. Although the Congressional coalitions have yet to be formed it is expected that Morena and its allied parties will have a majority in both the lower house of Mexico’s Congress and the Senate. 

In his acceptance speech Lopez Obrador sought to unify Mexico after a divisive and bitter electoral campaign. He said that he would look out for the poor and engage with Mexicans of all backgrounds. Regarding the relationship with the U.S., Lopez Obrador said that he would seek a relationship that is "rooted in mutual respect and in defense of our migrant countrymen who work and live honestly in that country." AMLO changed his tone towards the U.S. during the election – his language was initially more combative. President Trump tweeted his congratulations to Lopez Obrador after the acceptance speech.  

Lopez Obrador has been a controversial figure in Mexican politics. Many members of the business community and Mexican elite fear that he will return Mexico to a state-driven economy and undo many of the economic reforms which have been implemented over the past 20 years. Lopez Obrador has said that though he intends to, for example, review all oil contracts made by the Peña Nieto government he will not undo major reforms and has insisted that he is not a leftist populist like the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. 

Lopez Obrador’s economic platform was not well-defined during the election although he said that by tackling corruption he will reduce inequality. He also said that he will appoint a new negotiating team for NAFTA, while President Trump has said that he would not sign any new deal until after the U.S. congressional elections in November.  

Lopez Obrador will have many challenges facing him when he becomes the President including Mexico’s stagnating economy and wide income inequality, violence perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations, and a tricky bilateral relationship with the U.S. We will be watching Lopez Obrador’s personnel appointments and policy pronouncements during his five month period as president-elect, in order to assess how his presidency will potentially unfold.

June 2018

By Jeremiah J. Baronberg and Mathilde Defarges

Implications for global, European companies

On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States would end its participation in the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The multi-nation agreement was reached in Vienna, Austria on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany) together with the European Union.

In the United States, reaction to President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal was mixed. Some Members of Congress said it was a mistake, while others praised the move. Senate Republican Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan each called the deal “flawed from the beginning,” while House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi said “this rash decision isolates America, not Iran” and Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, who had originally opposed the deal, said it was a mistake to withdraw. Other senior lawmakers who had also originally opposed the deal, such as House Foreign Affairs Republican Committee Chair Ed Royce and Democratic Ranking Member Eliot Engel also said it was a mistake to now back out on the deal—over concerns about the message the move sends to allies and foes such as North Korea and absent an alternative strategy for preventing Iran from restarting its nuclear weapons program.

In Europe, EU leaders reacted swiftly, announcing that it would continue to abide by the agreement “as long as Iran remains fully committed to it.” EU President Donald Tusk said “I would like our debate to reconfirm without any doubt that as long as Iran respects the provisions of the deal, the EU will also respect it,” while Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security and European Commission Vice President, said “We…regretted the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear deal and we recognized that the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran constitute essential parts of the agreement.” In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, Mogherini, together with European foreign ministers met with their Iranian counterparts in a bid to preserve the deal’s core functions.

The JCPOA’s lifting of economic sanctions

The JCPOA, which from the Western governments’ negotiating perspective was meant to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions also provided for, in exchange, the lifting of certain nuclear-related “secondary sanctions.” Secondary sanctions are specific tools designed to penalize non-U.S. companies and persons who commercially transact with designated countries, in this case, Iran—even if those transactions do not involve the U.S.—by limiting their access to the U.S. financial system, thereby isolating Iran from the global economy.

As part of the JCPOA’s provisions, the lifting of secondary sanctions resulted in the re-establishment of commercial ties between such entities—European ones, in particular—who sought access to the Iranian market. Likewise, the JCPOA also provided exemptions to certain sanctions for U.S. companies—designed and enforced by the Obama administration to extract concessions from Iran—that allowed American entities with foreign subsidiaries to trade, finance, insure, and invest in Iran.

Taking advantage of the lifted sanctions since the deal was struck in 2015, a number of European companies—among them German, French, UK, Danish, and Italian firms such as Airbus, Eni, Danieli, Total, Peugeot Citroën (Groupe PSA), Renault, Volkswagen, Siemens, Bosch, Royal Dutch Shell, TORM, and Maersk—inked business deals with Iran based on the continent’s long-standing economic and diplomatic relations with the country. (Comparatively fewer Asian and American companies, including Boeing, Procter & Gamble, Honeywell, Dover, Chubb, and GE sought to enter Iran’s untapped market of 80 million people.) While still not yet considered a huge amount, nevertheless, the EU exported approximately $13 billion in goods to Iran in 2017, a 66 percent increase from 2015. Likewise, since the secondary sanctions were lifted, exports by Iran to the European Union grew tenfold.

U.S. moves to re-impose secondary sanctions: Where does that leave EU companies?

The Trump administration’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the JCPOA—despite sustained European efforts to the contrary—was accompanied by its stated commitment to re-impose pre-JCPOA era U.S. economic sanctions on Iran. These include primary sanctions, which apply to U.S. companies and persons as well as secondary sanctions. The re-imposed sanctions don’t take effect immediately however; the U.S. Treasury Department, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has indicated that it will delay their implementation by providing a “wind-down” period of 90 and 180 days, depending on different categories of activity involving Iran—in order “to minimize the impact of sanctions on the legitimate activities of those parties undertaken prior to the imposition of sanctions.” This process is set to be completed by November 4, 2018.

In a follow-up speech by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the U.S. indicated that it would “send teams of specialists to countries around the world to further explain administration policy, to discuss the implications of sanctions we imposition, and to listen.”

As a result, global entities—U.S. and otherwise—with business ties to Iran are now actively assessing the risk, exposure, and impact of their continued operations in, and partnerships with, the country, including the need to cancel contracts and suspend joint ventures and subsidiary activities.

In a clear recognition of the threat posed by the reinstated U.S. secondary sanctions, the EU indicated that it was moving to shield its businesses from the sanctions, including activating a so-called “blocking” regulation designed to counteract U.S. sanctions and allow trade to continue, while softening the sanctions’ impact. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said, “We have to protect our companies. We have to protect mainly those who – mainly small and medium-sized enterprises – did invest in Iran, and we cannot leave them alone.”

French President Emmanuel Macron added, “International companies with interests in many countries make their own choices according to their own interests. They should continue to have this freedom.” UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said, “We will cooperate with the other parties to ensure that while Iran continues to restrict its nuclear program, then its people will benefit from sanctions relief in accordance with the central bargain of the deal.”

Other countries, such as India, have said that they will continue doing business with Iran, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions.

In the ensuing months before U.S. sanctions take effect, European companies are now actively taking steps to mitigate their risk and exposure to the reinstated secondary sanctions regime, including ensuring that their business compliance programs are fully up-to-date with U.S. protocols and that they are regularly screening any and all parties in Iran with whom they may have dealings.

In some cases, countries and companies are seeking to secure specific carve-outs from the renewed sanctions through direct lobbying and negotiations with the U.S. Treasury Department, although exactly which sectors or countries will qualify has not been confirmed. French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire is reportedly in negotiations with U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to obtain temporary or permanent exemptions for French companies doing business with Iran.

We will continue to monitor these developments and their impact on global business.

June 2018

By Daniel P. Erikson and Gabriella Ippolito

Over the past two decades, Venezuela’s economic and political decline has been accompanied by its emergence as the epicenter of strange news from the Americas. The government at one point moved its clocks back by one-half hour, then changed its mind nine years later to move them forward; its president Nicolas Maduro has conversed with a small bird who he claimed represented the country’s late leader, Hugo Chavez; and the government introduced the “petro,” a new oil-based crypto-currency.

Even by Venezuela’s admittedly high standards, however, the seven days from May 20 to May 26, 2018 will go down in memory as one of the stranger weeks in the country’s recent memory. It began with Venezuela holding a presidential election on Sunday, May 20 that was roundly condemned by the international community, followed by new U.S. sanctions and mutual expulsions of senior diplomats, featured a surprise visit by Republican Chairman of Senator Foreign Relations Committee Bob Corker, and ended with a meeting between former U.S. political prisoner Josh Holt and President Trump in the Oval Office.

The sudden crush of urgent developments made for a head-snapping set of events whose effects will linger for months to come.

Sunday, May 20

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro won a second term in office, easily defeating his main challenger, former Governor of Lara state Henri Falcon in a vote of 67.7% to 21.2%. Turnout was only at 46.1 percent (it was 80 percent in the most recent prior election). Falcon said that, “the process undoubtedly lacks legitimacy and as such we do not recognize it.” The election results were rejected by the United States, the European Union, and a group of sixteen regional countries known as “the Lima Group,” due to concerns about widespread election tampering and the ban on the country’s most recognizable opposition politicians including Henrique Capriles, Leopoldo Lopez, and Antonio Ledezma, among others. 

Monday, May 21

President Trump signed a new executive order on Venezuela that imposed new sanctions on Venezuela with the aim of blocking Maduro from selling government debt. No U.S. companies or citizens are allowed to buy debt from the Venezuelan government or Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state-run oil company. This latest round of sanctions by the Trump administration followed a new set of sanctions targeting senior Venezuelan official Diosdado Cabello just before the elections. However, the U.S. Government has yet to impose direct sanctions on the oil sector which remains the Venezuelan government’s primary source of financing. 

Tuesday, May 22

Venezuela expelled the top two US diplomatic envoys in Caracas, Chargé d’Affaires Todd Robinson and Brian Naranjo, the deputy chief of mission at the Embassy. Maduro accused the two U.S. officials of interfering in the Venezuelan election and said that the expulsions were "in defense of the dignity of the homeland." U.S. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert responded that “we completely reject the false allegations that have been made by the Maduro regime against our two colleagues.”

Wednesday, May 23

The United States reciprocated the diplomatic expulsions by ordering the departure of two Venezuelan diplomats, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Venezuelan embassy in Washington, Carlos J. Ron, and the deputy consul general of Venezuela’s consulate in Houston, Carlos Paredes Colmenares. Just before the expulsions, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned, “We will respond appropriately and reciprocally, but also perhaps proportionately,” during a congressional hearing. Maduro has since nominated Carlos Ron to be Venezuela’s next Vice Minister for International Relations with North America. 

Thursday, May 24

President Maduro moved up his inauguration by eight months to be sworn in for a second six-year term. He was sworn in in front of the Constituent Assembly not the National Assembly, as is mandated by the Venezuelan Constitution. In his speech Maduro said that, “Venezuela has once more ratified its path, socialism. You’ve elected a president to build socialism, to resolve the problems, for dialogue and peace.” The government said a second inauguration would take place on January 10, 2019, which would normally mark the beginning of the president's next full term.

Friday, May 25

Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee, the influential chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, flew to Venezuela to meet with President Maduro just days after U.S. diplomats were ejected from the country. He was accompanied by his aide Caleb McCarry, a Latin America expert with deep knowledge of Venezuela. Following the meeting, Maduro said that he and Corker were “strengthening international relationships” and Venezuela’s Information Minister said it was a gesture aimed at promoting “dialogue and respect toward our independence.” Upon learning of the trip, Senator Marco Rubio tweeted, “Any U.S. Senator can meet with whoever they want. But no matter how many senators dictator @NicolasMaduro gets to meet with him, U.S. sanctions will go away when Maduro leaves & democracy returns.”

Saturday, May 26

In the morning, the Venezuelan government released Josh Holt, a former Mormon missionary from Utah, who had been imprisoned in Venezuela for two years on specious weapons charges, as well as his Venezuelan wife, Thamy Caleño. Upon his liberation, Holt flew back to Washington, D.C. with Senator Corker, and was received by President Trump in the Oval Office. Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah released a statement welcoming the release and praising the efforts of Senator Corker and his staff. The White House averred that "no concessions" were made to the Venezuelan government to secure Holt’s return, although the surprise good news story did prompt a cascade of positive press and briefly moved the spotlight off of Venezuela’s troubled election. In his meeting with Holt, President Trump told him that “you’ve gone through a lot, more than most people could endure,” and that “you were a tough one, I have to tell you, that was a tough situation.” President Trump also thanked Senator Corker, as well as members of Utah’s congressional delegation, Senator Hatch, Senator Mike Lee, and Representative Mia Love. Meanwhile, Senator Rubio of Florida, said, “I’m glad Josh Holt is home,” and warned, “This has nothing to do with the broader issue of sanctions, those things stay in place, the administration made that clear policy has not changed.”

What Next?

On May 27, the Associated Press published a detailed blow-by-blow of the events that led to Josh Holt’s release. In early June, the Organization of American States hosted a special permanent council meeting to address the aftermath of the Venezuelan elections and voted to hold an extraordinary assembly to decide on Venezuela’s expulsion from the body.

Meanwhile, the week of May 20-26 marked seven days that will leave a deep imprint on Venezuela and U.S.-Venezuelan relations. President Nicolas Maduro won a new six-year mandate that was roundly rejected by the international community. Official U.S.-Venezuelan diplomatic relations deteriorated to new lows even as a little-known diplomatic back channel won the release of imprisoned American Josh Holt. President Trump was able to claim a diplomatic victory that occurred largely outside the efforts of his Administration. And Holt was able to return to his family to Utah, ending a two year ordeal that had further disrupted relations between both countries. Thus, in the space of seven short days, Venezuela careened through an election, sanctions, two sets of diplomatic expulsions, an inauguration, congressional diplomacy, and a prisoner liberation.

In the final analysis, Venezuela’s wild week demonstrates that the country will retain its capacity to surprise as its political drama churns towards an unknown future.

June 2018

By Pero Jolevski, with Jeremiah J. Baronberg

In recent years, Monte Carlo, Monaco has played host to an important international conference dedicated to advancing clean, secure, sustainable, and reliable sources of energy.

Founded in January 2016 by the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation, former president of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski’s Foundation Amicus Europae, and the Ukraine energy group, Burisma, the annual Energy Security for the Future forum has become a veritable who’s who of global clean energy advocates and experts to discuss and share ideas on creating a single, energy-safe market utilizing alternative energy and innovative technologies.

The forum serves as a forward-thinking venue for discussing the challenges of achieving energy independence for Europe—and the positive role that Ukraine can play in the European system of collective security. The focus of the 2018 forum was “Energy Security for the Future: Revolutionary Thinking,” and welcomed over 400 attendees from around the world.

Former president of Poland Alexander Kwasniewski opened the forum, saying,

“Economic relations, energy and politics in Europe are undergoing the most ambitious changes in their history after World War II. Russia’s policy is the most powerful destabilizing factor in Europe. We must find that unique unified model of energy security that will exclude Russia’s political and economic interference in the internal policy of European states, including Ukraine.”

Former president of the European Commission and Italian prime minister Romano Prodi said,

“We are now entering a stage of global warming that requires the introduction of an effective policy, much more difficult than simple mathematical calculations. Less fossil fuels, more renewable energy sources.”

President of Latvia Raimonds Vējonis delivered the keynote address, highlighting the importance of the European Union remaining unified in its fight against climate change and implementing the terms of The Paris Agreement. President Vējonis, the only sitting head of state who is a member of the Green Party, also outlined the steps leaders should take in combating disinformation about climate change and the importance of educating citizens about their role.

A discussion of the importance of advancing clean, secure, sustainable, and reliable energy sources in the context of the transatlantic alliance followed President Vējonis remarks. Joining the panel discussion from the U.S. were former U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, former Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, and former U.S. Special Envoy for Energy Affairs David Goldwyn. The Europeans on the panel included former prime minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolanek, former European Commissioner for Energy and Development Andris Piebalgs, and Member of UK Parliament Mark Pritchard. This transatlantic panel engaged in a robust discussion ranging from the challenges facing the U.S. and EU transatlantic energy dialogue, the growing energy resources of the United States, the drive by Russia to control Europe’s energy market, and the varying responses to these challenges for European heads of state.

Several afternoon panels addressed such topics as: global energy futures; energy infrastructure, supply, and diversification; and future cities, including innovation and sustainability.

We will continue to report on these and other innovative and forward-thinking gatherings based on our commitment to supporting a sustainable and secure energy future.

May 2018

By Daniel P. Erikson

On April 19, 2018, the Castro era came to an end in Cuba. After 59 years of rule by Fidel Castro (1959-2006) and his younger brother Raul (2006-2018), Cuba’s first vice president Miguel Díaz-Canel formally assumed the role of Cuba’s new president. With the death of Fidel Castro in 2016, and now the semi-retirement of the 86-year old Raul (who will remain the top official of Cuba’s Communist Party), Díaz-Canel is Cuba’s first leader born after the Cuban Revolution. The 58-year old top official is expected to pursue a path of modest, incremental reforms in the face of Cuba’s pressing economic and social challenges. In his inaugural address, Díaz-Canel declared there is, "no room in Cuba for those who strive for the restoration of capitalism," signaling that he is not likely to break from Cuban communism anytime soon.

Ten years ago, during the transition of power from Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba, and from George W. Bush to Barack Obama in the United States, I wrote a book describing the competing tensions in Havana and Washington called The Cuba Wars. After detailing the multiple political, ideological, cultural and security confrontations between the two countries, I concluded that “the next revolution will be the revolution of expectations that is slowly being unleashed in Cuba by the unfolding leadership transition, and it will undoubtedly be matched by rising expectations for a change in U.S. policy when the next American president . . . steps into the White House.” And indeed, during President Obama’s time in office, a significant breakthrough in U.S.-Cuban relations did take place.

Well, that was then and this is now. Given the importance of this political moment in Cuba, a wide range of academics and experts have offered their analysis of Cuba’s leadership change and predictions of what the future may hold – and how the United States should respond. There are a few telling personal details, like Miguel Díaz-Canel once rode a bicycle in his provincial Cuban neighborhood and is known to use an iPad, and an overarching consensus that his political and economic choices will be severely constrained by the legacy of the Castro rule and his own limited sources of power. Below is a survey of the best recent articles and books on what the future holds for Cuba and U.S.-Cuba relations.

• In a major Brookings report on Cuba’s Economy After Raul Castro: A Tale of Three Worlds, non-resident fellow Richard Feinberg illustrates that the once monolithic Cuban economy has gotten more complicated, and more interesting. He examines Cuba’s “three worlds” – state companies, joint ventures with foreign investment, and an emerging entrepreneurial sector – and suggests that together they contain the ingredients of a viable national economic policy.
  
  
• In Raul Castro Prepares to Resign as Cuba’s President, Closing a Dynasty, Azam Ahmed of the New York Times outlines the gauntlet of challenges facing Miguel Díaz-Canel, including Cuba’s fading but still powerful revolutionary generation, the challenges posed by the United States and Venezuela, attracting investment, and unifying the dual currency. Ahmed concludes that “even the most seasoned Cuba experts have only faint clues as to what he will do, how he will lead, and how much latitude he will have to chart his own course.” 
  
  
• In Fidel Died and Raul Resigned, but Castros Still Hold Sway in Cuba, Times reporter Frances Robles reminds us that the Castros are still very much in the picture. In Who is Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cuba’s New President?, Ahmed and Robles sketch a portrait of a faithful and militant Communist Party loyalist who nevertheless patiently listens to complaints, is comfortable with social liberalism, and would rather shake hands with a dissident than risk being rude.
  
  
• In her Foreign Affairs article Cuba After the Castros, Marguerite Jimenez, a former U.S. Commerce Department official and Cuba expert at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), urges the Trump Administration to drop its hostility towards Cuba in exchange for supporting a process of change on the island, which would make it easier for Díaz-Canel to embrace a path of reform.
  
  
• In A Castro in All But Name?, former top CIA analyst and author Brian Latell tells Politico readers not to be fooled by Miguel Díaz-Canel’s relaxed appearance akin to “a business executive on vacation.” In order to succeed, Díaz-Canel will have to roll up his sleeves and complete the reforms that Raul began, while navigating “a leadership class riven by disputes between economic reformers and old guard Marxist intransigents.”
  
  
• We Shouldn’t Ignore Cuba, warns Columbia University scholar Christopher Sabatini in the New York Times, especially given that the specter of Castroism, and a crumbling and fragile economy, will hem in Miguel Díaz-Canel’s policy choices. The answer, he says, is “cautious, principled” engagement by the United States and support from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
  
  
• In Time to Tighten the Screws on Cuba?, former diplomat Elliott Abrams of the Council on Foreign Relations assesses that both the Obama and Trump administrations have failed to win human rights concessions from the Cuban government. His solution is to turn up the heat, arguing that “the United States should consider stepping up pressure on Havana, relenting only when new leadership grants the Cuban people real democratic gains.”
  
  
• Writing for Americas Quarterly, American University scholar William Leogrande ponders How to Stop the U.S.-Cuba Backslide. LeoGrande argues that the U.S. and Cuba need to break the current impasse which started with the alleged sonic attacks on US (and Canadian) Embassy personnel in Havana. He says that the State Department needs to decide, “what conditions would be sufficiently credible to restore the embassies to full strength even if the mystery of the health problems is never solved.” Separately, in two pieces for The Conversation, Leogrande reviews the challenges facing Miguel Díaz-Canel and ponders whether there will ever be a Trump Tower in Havana.
  
  
• Emily Mendrala of Center for Democracy in the Americas fears the United States is missing in action. She writes in The Hill that, In Cuba, Let’s Get back in the Game, calling for the Trump Administration to fully staff the U.S. embassy in Havana and step up investigations to resolve the health incidents affecting American diplomats allegedly affected by sonic disturbances. Otherwise, she advises, U.S. interests in Cuba will be undermined by faltering bilateral cooperation and reduced contacts on the island as new leadership takes the helm.
  
  
• In Cuban Communism Is at Its Reform-or-Die Moment, veteran reporter Melissa Chan argues in Foreign Policy that Díaz-Canel will need to focus on “bread-and-butter issues” to maintain the goodwill of ordinary Cubans who are suffering from the stagnant economy. Otherwise they will keep voting with their feet, by leaving the island for the United States. 
  
  
• Brookings scholar Ted Piccone prophesizes that U.S.-Cuban relations are about to get worse. Noting the rising influence of Florida Senator Marco Rubio, and the appointment of foreign policy conservatives like National security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Piccone says “we should expect the White House to double down on its first year’s embrace of punitive regime change.”
  
  
• In Cuba After the Castros: The country and its broken economy need a fresh start Bloomberg’s editors argue that Raúl Castro failed to deliver long-promised reforms and note that Díaz-Canel has to reform the dual currency system and make other economic reforms such as giving farmers the right to own land, expanding the list of authorized private enterprises, and enabling foreign businesses to directly hire their own workers.
  
  
• For those wish to dig deeper into the recent past of U.S.-Cuban relations, Ambassador Vicki Huddleston’s memoir, Our Woman In Havana, offers a guided tour of the past three decades, from Washington to Miami to Havana, and all the stops in between. At the end of her compelling book, she glimpses a future where “Cuba’s youth would someday prefer Havana to Miami,” but concedes that this vision is slipping further out of reach.

Welcome to the future

Even without a Castro at the helm, Cuba remains one of the world’s last remaining communist strongholds, and the U.S. embargo of Cuba is among the most comprehensive, far-reaching, and long-lasting policies of its kind in the world. Despite the many developments over the past decade – including the death of Fidel Castro, the historic opening pursued by Barack Obama, the sharp reversals of the Trump administration, and the retirement of Raul Castro and the rise of Miguel Díaz-Canel – those two facts are still true. While Díaz-Canel’s precise reform agenda remains unknown, and the vicissitudes of American politics will be unpredictable, it seems clear that the policy battles over Cuba will remain as dynamic as ever.

For Cuba-watchers who have long waited to see the shape of post-Castro Cuba, the future finally seems clear, even as the present remains shrouded in mystery.

May 2018

By Mathilde Defarges and Sally A. Painter with Jeremiah J. Baronberg

“The miracle of the relationship between the United States and France is that we have never lost this special bond deeply rooted not only in our history, but also in our flesh. - President Macron in his speech to U.S. Congress, April 25, 2018

The French-American alliance was on theatrical display last week in Washington, DC, as President Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte were fêted during an official U.S. state visit at the invitation of President Donald Trump, the first of his administration. The highly symbolic agenda contained numerous references to the historical relationship between the two nations—and featured a state dinner at the White House and private affair at Mount Vernon, a ceremonial tree-planting, a joint press conference with both presidents, and a meeting with Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, culminating in Macron’s impassioned speech (in perfect English, no less) before a joint session of U.S. Congress. Before jetting back to Paris, President Macron in rolled-up shirtsleeves—clearly basking in his element—held forth with university students in an informal town hall format before a packed basketball arena at The George Washington University.

What was the impact of Macron’s visit and what were its concrete outcomes?

In Washington, the enthusiasm for Macron—at times bordering on outright exuberance—was unmistakable. He was embraced and lauded by Trump, applauded by both political parties in Congress, and, with his cool, articulate, and youthful energy, enamored the next generation. At each venue, the French-American alliance was celebrated while the Transatlantic relationship seems to have received a much needed boost. Under his newly assertive leadership, economic reform proposals, and a bold vision for France’s expanded and unapologetic international role in global affairs, France is now very much back on the U.S. map, if not around the world. Moreover, Macron has clearly become the U.S. president’s favored leader and lynchpin for approaching Europe, having supplanted a weakened German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UK Prime Minister Theresa May. This fact should not be underestimated: the Trump-Macron personal affinity has the potential to play a stabilizing role and in addressing future challenges.

Yet for all its pomp and circumstance, the Macron visit also displayed palpable differences on matters of policy substance whose medium term milestones may be a more difficult measuring stick for the bilateral relationship. In his address to Congress, Macron highlighted the most salient ones: climate, multilateralism, the threat of trade wars and the corresponding May 1 deadline to exempt Europe from Trump’s steel tariffs (which has since been delayed by the U.S. to June 1), and the Iran nuclear deal, whose deadline of May 12 for certification by the U.S. is fast approaching. Macron appears to have tried to sway Trump on each. Whether he succeeds and how these specific issues play out could have significant impact and ramifications and should be watched closely.

In many respects, this can all be contrasted with Europe, where Macron was once again seen as positioning himself as the new, self-declared leader of the Member States of the European Union. Indeed, his speech before U.S. Congress was seen as being directed as much at European ears as American ones, echoing as it did his address to European Parliament the week prior. While a certain amount of pride was registered in his representing France (France is Back!) and speaking on behalf of the EU collectively, this sentiment clearly has another edge: that Macron assumed this leadership mantle without asking for it, posing as the bloc’s self-appointed leader, and has yet to convince the other 27 member states to agree with his vision on a range of policy matters. It seems that trying to lead the EU isn’t as simple as Macron may be publicly posturing. But that certainly hasn’t stopped him from trying.

Indeed, upon his arrival back in France, Macron was confronted with stark pushback on some of his signature proposals, including the so-called “GAFA” taxation (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon), which, following a meeting of the Eurozone Ministers, the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council decided must be solved at a multilateral level through the OECD—a move that was supported by Germany and the UK, among others. Not to mention his proposal—referenced in his speech to Congress—to negotiate a new deal with Iran to contain its nuclear program, while also maintaining the existing framework. If his goal is to get Trump to stick with the Iran deal while effecting a compromise, President Macron is in fact not empowered to speak on behalf of the EU in this regard, let alone Turkey.

This has all been overshadowed by the threat of a trade war between Europe and the U.S., in part sparked by the Trump administration’s proposed steel and aluminum tariffs, which were set to take effect for the EU on May 1. At the last minute, President Trump postponed that decision by one month until June 1, granting the bloc a temporary exemption and more time to negotiate a deal that would fully exempt it from the tariffs. Previously, Germany has said that Ms. Merkel, Mr. Macron, and Ms. May had all agreed that if the steel tariffs were to enter into force, “The European Union should be ready to decisively defend its interests within the framework of multilateral trade rules” and had threatened to retaliate against more than $3 billion in U.S. exports. While the threat of retaliation seems to have been alleviated temporarily, the imperative now will be to arrive at a deal to avoid the U.S. tariffs entirely. The reaction from the European Commission to Monday’s temporary exemption was swift: “The EU should be fully and permanently exempted from these measures, as they cannot be justified on the grounds of national security,” it said in a statement.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that for all its reported fanfare, Macron’s close relationship with Trump has brought with it a not insignificant risk of backlash back home, where questions persist of “who is playing who” and how the two can be so close given their clear divide on matters of substance. This played out when President Trump congratulated Mr. Macron for his own immigration reform proposals, damaging him politically at a moment when his highly criticized domestic package had passed in a first reading at the National Assembly just the Sunday before. It seems a warm embrace by Mr. Trump is not always what the doctor ordered.

It is still too early to say if Macron’s U.S. visit—in which he publicly performed at his best—can be called a success. In the short term, the upcoming deadlines of May 12 (Iran deal) and June 1 (EU exemption on U.S. steel tariffs) will tell us more about President Macron’s influence on President Trump. Only time will tell how that special relationship between the two leaders will respond to challenges down the road. Regarding Macron’s leadership of Europe, there is a gap between his big picture vision and internal debates between EU member states. As the name of his political party “En Marche” underscores, President Macron’s vision is a work in progress.

We’ll be watching.

May 2018

By Daniel P. Erikson and Gabriella Ippolito

When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force between the United States, Canada and Mexico on January 1, 1994, it created the world’s largest free trade area of 444 million people that now produces $17 trillion worth of goods and services. Canada is presently the United States’ second largest trading partner and Mexico is the third largest. U.S. trade with its NAFTA partners stands at $1.2 trillion and the two countries buy one-third of U.S. exports.

Today, the efforts to renegotiate NAFTA continue to churn forward more than five months after blowing through the initial deadline of December 2017. We first described NAFTA as “in the cross-hairs” last September, while in October we wrote that NAFTA was “still on the brink,” and in November we warned of “turbulence ahead.”  Even now, six months later, the question remains whether extending the talks into serious overtime will yield anything different than the unilateral withdrawal from NAFTA by U.S. President Donald Trump, or merely the fizzling of these efforts into the cauldron of Mexico’s 2018 presidential election politics. 

The first round of NAFTA negotiations was held in August 2017, and the negotiating teams from the United States, Canada, and Mexico completed the eighth round in late April. To date, seven chapters have been concluded on competition, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), anti-corruption, regulatory practices, public administration, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and telecommunications. The chapters on digital trade and energy are also close to completion, which would bring the total number of completed chapters to nine out of 30.

What’s happening now?

• High-level meetings took place throughout the week of April 23 with the aim of completing the agreement by May 1, which was when temporary exemptions for U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico were due to expire. The agreement was not completed and talks are scheduled to resume on May 7. In the meantime the Trump administration has extended the exemptions on aluminum tariffs to June 1.
• Trade negotiators from the U.S., Canada and Mexico have been working around the clock in Washington D.C. to finish negotiations and achieve a deal “in principle” before the Mexican election on July 1. The administration also wants a deal by the end of May so that the trade agreement has six months, as required by the U.S. Congress, to be analyzed and approved before the U.S. congressional mid-term elections in November.
• Recent negotiations have largely focused on “rules of origin,” particularly for the automotive sector. The Trump administration initially demanded that North American-built cars contain 85 percent content made in NAFTA countries by value, up from 62.5 percent. Recent reports suggest that the U.S. has lowered this figure to 75 percent, and the Canadian delegation acknowledges that progress has been made.
• Meanwhile, two particularly thorny U.S. proposals, the “sunset clause” that would require NAFTA to be renegotiated every five years, and the removal of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause, remain unacceptable by the business communities in all three countries.

What are people saying?

• “Now our time is running very short. I fear that the longer we proceed, the more political headwinds we will feel.” – United States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer in Mexico City in early March
• There is a real possibility that we could arrive at an agreement within the next several weeks.” –U.S. Vice President Mike Pence on the margins of the Summit of the Americas on April 14
• ”My negotiating team is practically living in Washington.” – Mexican Economy Minister Ildefonso Guajardo in mid-April
• “There’s positive advances that have been made, but it’s not over ’til it’s over.” – Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Halifax, Nova Scotia on April 21
• “We fully trust and we have optimism as well that we’re going to be concluding the renegotiation, modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement with North America, as I have said, ensuring benefits for all its partners.” – Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto on April 22
• “Mexico, whose laws on immigration are very tough, must stop people from going through Mexico and into the U.S. We may make this a condition of the new NAFTA Agreement.” – U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted on April 23
• “But we’re doing very nicely with NAFTA. I could make a deal really quickly, but I’m not sure that’s in the best interests of the United States. But we’ll see what happens.” – U.S. President Donald Trump said in Washington, D.C. on April 24
• “There is a very strong, very committed, good faith effort for all three parties to work 24/7 on this and to try and reach an agreement.” – Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland in Washington on April 25

What’s next?

On April 27, the NAFTA negotiators from the United States, Canada, and Mexico ended their talks in Washington without reaching agreement by the new deadline of May 1. Talk are set to resume on May 7, with the aim of getting a deal done “in principle” in May. The delegations from the United States, Canada, and Mexico are expected to continue focusing on rules of origin and the automotive sector, which pose the largest challenges at this juncture. However, if the NAFTA negotiations do not reach a major breakthrough during this current stage of overtime, then the prospects for a “win-win-win” outcome may be eclipsed by a “sudden death” scenario triggered by the Mexican presidential elections on July 1 and then the U.S. midterm elections in November. In this case, the result would be no new deal. 

April 2018

By Mathilde Defarges and Jeremiah J. Baronberg

On April 23-25, 2018, U.S. President Trump will host French President Emmanuel Macron for a “state visit,” the highest ranking visit of a foreign leader to the United States. State visits in the U.S.—which can only be offered to a chief of state at the invitation of the U.S. president—are considered the highest expression of friendly bilateral relations and are characterized by an emphasis on official public ceremonies.

The two leaders spoke by phone to discuss the upcoming visit, while noting their shared commitment to defeat ISIS (Daech, in French) in Iraq and Syria, including Macron's emphasis on coordinating actions through the international coalition. 

As the first such occasion since Trump took office in January 2017, President Macron’s U.S. visit will include a joint news conference and a state dinner as well as private dinner hosted by President Trump at George Washington’s home at Mount Vernon. U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Paul Ryan has also invited Macron to address a joint session of Congress on April 25.

The significance of President Trump’s invitation to Mr. Macron comes after Trump was hosted in France last year by Macron as the honored guest for the country’s most important national holiday, the annual Bastille Day military parade along the Champs-Elysées in Paris. The 2017 parade commemorated the 100th anniversary of America’s entry into World War I and included participation by both nations’ armed forces in an homage to French-American cooperation. President Trump was clearly impressed by the parade, noting his desire to hold a similar style military procession in the U.S. Afterwards, Macron said, “Mr. Trump’s presence at my side is a sign of an enduring friendship, and I want to thank him. Nothing can ever separate us…I want to thank America for the choice made 100 years ago.”

Much has since been made of the apparent bond and special rapport shared by the two presidents, who are said to speak by phone frequently. While their views on fundamental matters of substance and policy don’t always mesh (Paris climate agreement, Iran deal, trade), their discussions have been frank and President Trump has called their friendship “unbreakable.” As a U.S. observer recently noted: “Macron has succeeded where all others have failed, managing to criticize U.S. policies without becoming the latest Twitter target. In Trump’s eyes, Emmanuel seems to do no wrong.”

The specific agenda items for discussion during Macon’s visit have not been outlined, yet certain potential topics may prove controversial. Much has been made recently of Macron’s targeting of large tech companies to pay more taxes on profits earned in Europe—the so-called “GAFA” (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) taxation announced in conjunction with Germany. Trump has also targeted companies such as Amazon, saying it does not pay enough taxes. Macron is likely to use his address to Congress to raise such issues as the Paris climate agreement and concerns over the threat of trade wars (remember that Macron has met previously with U.S. Governors to attract states to support the Paris agreement).

For Trump, high on the list is his May 12 deadline for extending the Iran nuclear deal, reflected by several rounds of negotiations being conducted by U.S. State Department officials with France as well as with the UK and Germany, the so-called E3. Addressing U.S. and EU concerns over China’s trade practices may also play a role in discussions, while both sides may envision different strategies in this arena.

As has been his style after each foreign visit, President Macron is likely to make a public announcement to communicate what he feels will have been the direct results for France. In this respect, it is to be expected that he will endeavor to return home from his U.S. visit having achieved a significant outcome. Macron’s focus recently has been on attracting foreign investment and strategies to accelerate innovation, including investing 1.5 billion euros into research on artificial intelligence (AI), following concerns that France has fallen behind the U.S. and China.

We’ve noted before that this is a crucial time for the United States, Europe, and the Transatlantic partnership. With our shared history, democratic values, and traditional political-military ties, the French-American alliance is critical to this future. Let’s watch how the two countries’ leaders chart this course forward.

We’ll revisit this topic with further analysis and a debrief following the state visit.

April 2018

By Daniel P. Erikson

When leaders from nearly all the countries of the Americas gather in Lima, Peru next week, the unique circumstances may lead to an historic event: the first Summit of the Americas defined by honesty about the fundamental disagreements that shape the relationships among the United States, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean. 

When President Clinton convened the first Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida in 1994, a very different and then defensible idea took hold. Simply put, the concept was that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent wave of democratic transition in Latin America had ushered in a new era of common purpose and understanding, rooted in shared values, and that advancing human rights and promoting economic integration could bind the hemisphere together in an ever deeper embrace.

To a greater or lesser degree, that vision has guided inter-American summitry throughout the past quarter century, despite an accumulating body of evidence that the countries of the hemisphere only superficially agreed on basic values of democratic governance and were papering over much more fundamental disagreements related to open markets and free trade. Indeed, the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas that animated earlier summits, including the 1998 Summit in Santiago, Chile and the 2001 Summit in Quebec City, Canada was ultimately extinguished in the tumult of the 4th Summit, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 2005. President George W. Bush, the most pro-free trade U.S. president of the Summit era, attended its wake. The 2001 Quebec Summit was also notable for advancing an Inter-American Democratic Charter that was ultimately ratified by 34 countries in the hemisphere (Cuba excepted) in Lima, Peru later that year, only to be honored principally in the breach, most notably by Venezuela in recent years.

To his credit, President Obama attempted to rejuvenate the Summit process by reframing it away from a U.S.-led convocation of regional leaders to a forum animated by “equal partnership” among all the countries of the hemisphere. This declaration by President Obama at the 5th Summit in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago in 2009 was well-received, but did little to calm the turbulent water of hemispheric affairs, as was demonstrated a short three years later.

At the 6th Summit in 2012, hosted by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in the coastal city of Cartagena, deep divisions on immigration, counter-narcotics policies, and the exclusion of Cuba prevented the emergence of a new hemispheric consensus. Panama hosted the 7th Summit in 2015, which was dominated by the much-ballyhooed inclusion of President Raul Castro of Cuba, whose rapprochement with President Obama overshadowed intense diplomatic skirmishing between the United States and Venezuela and gave a sense that the Americas were finally whole and at peace.

The only problem was that the Summit process, once driven by the twin goals of democratic consolidation and economic integration, was now out of ideas. Where once there was a common agenda, now all that remained was an ersatz bonhomie.

Peru picked up the mantle and forged a new rallying cry based on combating corruption, an old idea made new again by the seeming bottomless set of graft scandals plaguing the region. Now all roads lead back to Lima, where the government of former President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski stands ready to host 34 leaders for the 8th Summit of the Americas on April 13-14, where they are due to discuss the theme of “Democratic Governance Against Corruption.”

Missing, of course, will be Kuczynski himself, since he was forced to resign over corruption charges on March 21. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who Kuczynski pointedly disinvited for violating democratic norms, still plans to attend, creating one more headache for the new Peruvian President Martin Vizcarra, who stands by his predecessor’s revocation. The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Uruguay have protested efforts to exclude Venezuela. Meanwhile, a variety of governments remain mired in corruption scandals so deep that avoiding accountability has become a vital component of maintaining power.

Then there is the matter of President Donald J. Trump, whose maiden voyage to Latin America would in ordinary times threaten to shatter regional harmony, given his various positions on drugs, crime, immigration, trade, and Cuba that run counter to what most Latin American governments claim to have wanted from the United States for many years. He may be somewhat disappointed to discover that it is already too late to play the spoiler, as the regional consensus upon which these Summits were once based evaporated long ago.

Against all odds then, the United States has an opportunity to once again lead by declaring that the era of false consensus is over and urging the leaders of the hemisphere to set aside the platitudes and the talking points in favor of a frank exchange on what role democracy and corruption, free trade, and immigration should play in relations among neighbors. President Trump did not create this opportunity but he should seize it, and other leaders should embrace the chance to express their unvarnished thoughts and beliefs.

This Summit, unlike all the others, can only be evaluated inversely to its stated achievements. Honest disagreement will be the mark of success. Fulsome declarations of a new shared vision and common goals will be the clearest sign of failure.

April 2018

By Sally A. Painter and Jeremiah J. Baronberg

This article was published by Balkan Insider.

“A Europe, whole free and at peace.”

These words, so often repeated, have served as a guiding beacon and vision for a stable and united Europe after centuries of violent conflict and the devastation of World War II. They provide a common understanding of a troubled past that informs the present and, by extension, points to a shared future.

Today, with the continent in flux, it is worth remembering that this vision of unity and integration did not emerge out of thin air. Common interests and shared culture helped secure the peace, while formalized Euro-Atlantic structures based on standards and values—most notably NATO, the European Union, and the OECD—served as the guarantors of this new norm and as the “connective tissue” among allies.

These organizations elevated and coordinated collective defense and security measures, underpinned economic and business transparency standards, and enshrined human rights and free expression protections. Without these institutions to maintain order and hold Europe together, it is anyone’s guess what the alternative might have been.

For the first 50 years after World War II, this vision achieved reality in Western Europe. Then, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe breathed new life into the European project by declaring their national objectives to join Europe and the West. Incentivized to institute difficult political, economic, and military reforms, each became full, contributing members of NATO and the EU.

However today, the European project is not complete. The Balkan region—which emerged from the 1990s after a decade of war, including in the former states of Yugoslavia—represents the last remaining frontier to achieving a Europe, ‘whole and free.’ Slovenia and Croatia (NATO and the EU) and Albania and Montenegro (NATO only) have been able to move forward on their European paths. Others, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia have seen their path to join Europe stalled or thwarted by regional dynamics and internal turmoil.

Macedonia, despite challenges and setbacks, has embraced radical economic and political reforms. Most important, it has served as an active contributor to NATO peacekeeping missions and has participated in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), closing its 17th NATO MAP cycle in 2017. Yet its path to NATO accession has been repeatedly blocked by Greece over the name of the country. Outsiders not fluent in Balkan politics are aghast at this rationale for an alliance based on values. Serbia, whose official stated goal of joining the EU has been reaffirmed consistently by successive leaders, is being held back by its relations with Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina, currently facing an internal political crisis, has contributed to NATO missions in Afghanistan and the U.S. coalition against ISIS. While it has been invited to join the MAP, it faces internal ethnic divisions and concerns over the sustainability and application of the Dayton Peace Accords.

In each case, public faith in a future rooted in Europe and its institutions is faltering. This trend, together with waning attention and commitment from the West, is fraught with danger and risk. The prospect of joining NATO and the EU has been a primary pillar for the relative stability in the region and an incentive for reforms. But without a clear path to joining these institutions, Balkan countries have undergone periods of illiberal tendencies—highlighted by democratic backsliding, setbacks to the rule of law, state capture, corruption and political patronage, economic malaise, and exacerbated inter-ethnic divisions both within and between countries.

Without a common, European vision to unite the region, alternatives—nationalism, ethnic polarization, zero sum strategies—become easy substitutes. Even worse, the absence of sustained attention and focus by the West has allowed other actors, primarily Russia and its proxies, to opportunistically exert a destabilizing influence and promote anti-EU sentiment across southeast Europe. Moreover, an assertive China and Turkey are each building their own soft power inroads.

What can be done?

The West should recognize that each Balkan country is unique and deserves support for its Euro-Atlantic accession. It should provide a tangible, incremental roadmap together with a clearly defined timeline for their reform agendas. Brussels and Washington need to be much more engaged and take a stake in continued progress on substantive democratic and economic reforms. As the Balkans’ biggest trading partner, Europe can also leverage its financial support and investment as carrots to further encourage—and help build the strong foundations necessary for—reform as well as peaceful coexistence.

Finally, we should not let the ‘perfect be the enemy of the good.’ That means that we must recognize and applaud the tremendous progress already made by these aspirant countries—as we did in previous rounds of NATO and EU enlargement—and that the criteria for accession must be flexible and, ultimately, based on the overriding concept that inclusion in these alliances is far better than the alternative.

The EU’s newly released strategy presents a helpful roadmap forward for the Balkans. Yet without the promise—and actual delivery—of Euro-Atlantic integration, the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace will not be complete. A new generation of citizens, leaders, and business entrepreneurs across the Balkans stands ready to tie its future to the West.

What message does our current ambivalence and perceived foot-dragging send to them? The time is now to make good on this vision.